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Executive summary
This Policy Contribution assesses whether European competition law could be applied 
more directly to state-owned enterprises that create an unlevel playing field in Europe 
because of the support they receive from their home governments. This issue has become 
a priority for many European Union countries and for the European Commission, given its 
impact on European economic autonomy. Competition law may not be the appropriate tool 
for addressing the granting of illegal subsidies or other forms of support in third countries, but 
it could be more effective than previously thought in dealing with the distortive effect of state-
owned entities on the EU internal market.
If State-Owned Enterprises are not resource-constrained or even profit maximising, 
they might be unconstrained by competitive pressures, therefore possessing a de-facto level of 
market power. By adapting existing antitrust theories of harm, such as predatory pricing, to fit 
the specific nature of SOEs, this Policy Contribution argues that it should be possible to add 
further tools to the EU’s toolbox. In any event, as part of its efforts to address the distortive 
effects on the internal market of foreign state ownership and subsidies, the European 
Commission should develop a coherent and proactive competition policy to provide 
guidance to the market.
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1 Introduction
The distortive effects that foreign state-owned or state-supported companies can have on 
European markets and on the European Union’s economic autonomy are starting to worry 
policymakers. The focus tends to be on the links between the Chinese government and 
Chinese businesses. The Chinese government’s patronage of companies threatens European 
value chains and possibly also Europe’s critical infrastructure, according to the European 
Commission’s in-house think tank, the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC, 2019). 
One of European Commission executive vice-president Margrethe Vestager’s new tasks is to 
develop tools and policies to address the unlevel playing field created by “the distortive effects 
of foreign state ownership and subsidies in the internal market” (Von der Leyen, 2019)1.  
There has been a plethora of proposals from European governments and industry groups 
on how to address this unlevel playing field, including reforming trade-defence instruments, 
but few proposals have explored competition policy options in detail2. Those that have looked 
at competition policy tended to focus on reforming European merger control, either to enable 
the creation of European champions or to screen foreign transactions more aggressively3. 
This Policy Contribution focuses on a different area of competition policy: how European 
abuse-of-dominance rules could address the anticompetitive effects of state support4. 
We first look at a pragmatic definition of companies benefitting from state support or state 
direction, and at the role of such companies in China, specifically how they enable Chinese 
industrial policy. We then review how competition law treats state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
exploring market power and other key considerations, before touching on predatory pric-
ing as a potentially fruitful theory of harm. We acknowledge certain challenges in enforcing 
competition rules against SOEs, notably sanctions. We conclude with recommendations on 
providing coherent guidance to the market.
2 Undertakings directed by the state: 
definitional issues
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2015 Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD, 2015a) define an SOE as a situation in which 
the state exercises legal ownership over an undertaking. This would include where the state 
1 See also the European Commission’s Joint Communication, EU-China – A strategic outlook (European Commis-
sion/High Representative, 2019) in which the Commission committed to finding means to “appropriately deal with 
the distortive effects of foreign state ownership and state financing of foreign companies on the EU internal market”.
2 See for example the group of EU countries making up les Amis de l’Industrie (2018), BDI (2019), the German Na-
tional Industrial Strategy 2030, presented on 5 February 2019 (BMWi, 2019), or the 2019 ‘Franco-German manifes-
to for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st century’ (BMWi/Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, 2019). 
Proposals include increasing the international competitive capacity of EU firms, boosting public and private risk 
investment, focusing on capacity building in specific sectors, increasing Europe’s competence in digital markets, 
engaging in joint projects for key enabling technologies and flanking measures such as creation of a European 
sovereign wealth fund, increasing Europe’s economic diplomacy through coordination of  EU and member-state 
trade and investment activities, and promoting European norms internationally.
3 See for example the 2019 joint proposals for modernising EU competition policy from the French, German and 
Polish governments (available at https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/M-O/modernising-eu-competi-
tion-policy.pdf), and Heim (2019).
4 This approach has some support, as expressed in a Dutch government non-paper of December 2019, which 
considers a range of options. See ‘Strengthening the level playing field on the internal market’, available at https://
www.permanentrepresentations.nl/binaries/nlatio/documents/publications/2019/12/09/non-paper-on-level-play-
ing-field/Dutch+nonpaper+on+Level+playing+field.pdf.
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is the ultimate shareholder, where corporations are established through legislation, or where 
the state exercises an equivalent degree of control through golden shares or other legal stipu-
lations.
However, a more pragmatic view is used by the European Commission (2017) in relation 
to China where it recognises that the division of companies into ‘private’ and ‘state-owned’ is 
too simplistic, especially as privately-owned companies might have close government links 
because of the strategic importance of the markets they are active in. Such companies might 
also assist in the execution of governments’ policy objectives (see for example Milhaupt and 
Zheng, 2015). 
In this Policy Contribution, the expression ‘state-owned enterprise’ or ‘SOE’ is used to 
mean not only enterprise that are legally owned by the state, but also those that are effectively 
controlled or directed by the state, notably in pursuit of government policy.
3 The function of commercial Chinese SOEs 
in pursuing state policies abroad
The substantial role of SOEs in the Chinese economy
 
gives the Chinese government an 
exceptional platform to exert control over its economy5. Notwithstanding announcements 
from China that pro-market SOE reforms are imminent, developments have rather confirmed 
the use of SOEs to pursue non-market goals. The European Commission (2017) highlighted 
different ways in which the Chinese state uses SOEs to drive strategic policy goals. It cites the 
2015 ‘Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and of 
the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises’ seeks to reinforce the 
role of state ownership of SOEs of a commercial nature “and to use such ownership for stra-
tegic economic goals decoupled from market rules”.
 
Under this guidance, the performance of 
commercial SOEs will also be assessed “on their efforts to serve national strategies, safeguard 
national security and the operation of the national economy, develop cutting-edge strategic 
industries and complete special tasks”6. 
These policies do not appear to be purely domestic. European Commission (2017) also 
noted the Chinese Government’s intention to maintain direct control over SOEs active in 
international markets, to which it would provide resources to aid such developments. There 
therefore appears to be a Chinese policy to foster the international competitive positions of 
certain firms, in order to serve the strategic goals of the country, notably to increase China’s 
international economic influence.
 
5 In 2014, SOEs represented 23 percent of the Fortune Global 500 list; China’s SOE sector alone employs about 20.2 
million people and is valued at $29.2 trillion (OECD, 2018; and the BIAC contribution to the OECD’s 2018 Global 
Forum on Competition on 'Competition law and state-owned enterprises', available at https://one.oecd.org/docu-
ment/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2018)73/en/pdf).
6 See also http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=26c39a43ea095fcebdfb&lib=law.
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4 SOEs and competition law
When an undertaking carries out an economic activity, its ownership is effectively irrelevant 
to competition law analysis7. Undertakings should not benefit from competitive advantage or 
immunity merely because they are government-owned (Fox and Healey, 2014). Competition 
law is therefore a powerful tool to address the activities of both domestic and foreign SOEs 
(OECD, 2015a), if they act in an anticompetitive manner. 
There are, however, a number of important characteristics that differentiate SOEs from 
private undertakings. For example, SOEs can benefit from significantly fewer regulatory 
constraints, such as employment or environmental protection conditions, softer budget con-
straints or access to credit on preferential terms, and subsidies (OECD, 2018). The state can 
also allow national champions to have unrestricted growth in their national market, protected 
from the rigours of foreign competition (European Commission/High Representative, 2019). 
These advantages translate into significant international competitive advantages that private 
enterprises cannot benefit from nor match. Given globalisation, increasingly global markets 
and cross-border transactions, the effects on the competitiveness of markets in different juris-
dictions can be broad-ranging (OECD, 2018). Competition law might therefore be interested 
in the effects of such advantages on market competition.  
The European Commission and national competition authorities in Europe have applied 
competition rules to tackle the anticompetitive impact of SOEs, but that has been done 
mainly for European SOEs in a largely uncoordinated manner8. Svetlicinii (2018) noted that 
there is little coherence or consistency in the approach of national European competition 
authorities to merger reviews involving Chinese SOEs. Furthermore, despite evidence of an 
increase in SOEs’ share of the economy generally there has been a marked decrease in the 
number of competition investigations and sanctions against these SOEs in Europe, and no 
European investigation has been opened against an SOE since 2014 (Schrepel, 2019).
It seems generally accepted that the strategic behaviour of state-funded or state-controlled 
enterprises could damage the functioning of the internal market. For the purposes of this 
paper, anticompetitive distortions are assumed to occur. However, more empirical work is 
needed to test those assumptions. It remains important for sound policy and for evidence-
based enforcement to establish observable facts of market distortion and of abuse. Without 
such an exercise, any policy or enforcement solutions proposed might not address the 
underlying problems, might be disproportionate or might result in unintended consequences. 
When considering its competition prioritisation strategies, the European Commission’s 
competition directorate-general (DG Competition) should engage with other Commission 
departments and with EU countries in order to identify and assess market distortion. 
Particular scrutiny could be applied to those sectors that are explicitly linked to a third 
country’s international industrial policy. It would of course be incumbent on the Commission 
to carefully select cases where there is prima facie evidence of harm, in order to ensure that 
there can be no criticism on the basis of protectionism. Indeed, if enforcement is not based on 
valid competition law grounds (but rather intends to protect industrial champions or pursue 
strategic or industrial-policy goals), cases against foreign SOEs might result in non-tariff 
barriers to trade (OECD, 2018). 
7 The OECD (2015b) defined the principle of competitive neutrality as being where “all enterprises, public or private, 
domestic or foreign, face the same set of rules, and where government’s contact, ownership or involvement in the 
marketplace, in fact or in law, does not confer an undue competitive advantage on any actual or potential market 
participant.”
8 European national competition authorities have also been active in investigation abusive practices by European 
SOEs. See for example the Italian Ferrovie dello Stato discriminatory practices case (1990); the Norwegian SAS 
predatory pricing case (2005); the Romanian CFR Marfa refusal to deal case (2006); the UK Cardiff Bus predatory 
pricing case (2008); and the German Deutsche Post AG margin squeeze case (2012).
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4.1 SOEs and market power 
Antitrust enforcement can only occur if the undertaking under investigation possesses market 
power. The EU court in the United Brands and Hoffmann-La Roche cases defined market 
power as; “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to pre-
vent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately 
of its consumers”9. The very fact that SOEs may benefit from access to state resources, or are 
subject to fewer financial obligations, can effectively cushion them from market pressures 
(which might indeed be the point of state involvement in the undertaking). The ability of 
SOEs to act in a manner that is unconstrained by competitive pressure would therefore be a 
critical factor in establishing market power; one could even argue that this could be a rebutta-
ble presumption.
The impact of anticompetitive international SOE activity will primarily be on the competi-
tive process, affecting competitors or customers (rather than any short-run consumer benefit 
in terms of, eg consumer prices), which might result in efficient competitors exiting the 
market (or not entering the market). Such a result is anathema to modern competition policy 
(Heim and Midoes, 2019). In this context, it would be logical for the Commission to focus on 
protecting the competitive process, as a proxy for long-run consumer welfare.
4.2 SOEs’ strategic incentives
Competition policy assumes that market players are economic entities seeking to maximise 
profits. SOEs, however, might prioritise strategic policy goals over profit-maximisation, and 
could be specifically required to do so by their government. As far as China is concerned, 
many SOEs appear to be established on the basis of carrying out government objectives, 
rather than correcting market failures (García-Herrero and Xu, 2017). Understanding the 
underlying strategic objectives of particular SOEs is therefore critical in appreciating whether 
they are acting as classic market participants or are (also) engaged in activities driven by 
strategic policy incentives. 
Where a state’s industrial strategies include the use of SOEs to control or affect specific 
markets, the result might be to distort effective competition and force efficient rival firms out 
of that market. In fact, where an SOE’s obligation to the state is to deliver on industrial policy, 
the SOE might be tempted to actively engage in exclusionary practices in order to gain market 
share and/or ensure strategic autonomy. This would suggest adapting the usual analytical 
tools used to assess markets and anti-competitive conduct, in order to take into account the 
activities and specificities of SEOs and ensure the neutral enforcement of a consumer welfare 
standard (OECD, 2015).
4.3 Predatory pricing
Dominant companies are prohibited from engaging in pricing below marginal cost, which 
they can afford to bear, as this might drive competition from the market in the long term. 
This theory is particularly interesting in the context of SOEs because, as noted above, SOEs 
might not be bound by classic industrial organisation pressures. SOEs may be able to sustain 
losses – and to do so over long periods – with no need to seek recoupment of lost ‘profits’ in 
the post-predation period10. The specificities of SOEs thus not only challenge the traditional 
notions of the relevant price-cost test, by which predatory pricing allegations should be 
measured, but also the ‘equally efficient competitor’ test given that the conditions of an SOE’s 
‘competitiveness’ may effectively be set by its government. 
9 See Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207, para-
graph 65, and Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paragraph 38.
10 This tension is explored by the Swedish contribution to the OECD’s 2018 Global Forum on Competition on 
'Competition law and state-owned enterprises', available at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/
WD(2018)54/en/pdf. 
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In the Deutsche Post case11, the European Commission concluded that Deutsche Post’s 
medium-term pricing strategy was not in its economic interest. Rather than implying that 
Deutsche Post should have been seeking to earn a commercial margin, the Commission 
applied the logic that setting loss-making prices was irrational unless the loss was to be 
compensated for through higher prices elsewhere or at a later date. The Commission did not 
explicitly consider whether Deutsche Post was likely to be able to recoup the identified losses 
or where from. This makes sense, as an SOE might not intend to recoup incurred losses nor 
might they be acting in their rational economic interest, given that – depending on the case – 
the SOE could be prioritising an industrial strategy required by the state. Therefore, predation 
theory could be explored in the SOE context.
5 Challenges to enforcement of competition 
rules against SOEs
Of course, investigating and establishing competition abuses by non-EU SOEs in the EU 
market is unlikely to be straightforward. SOEs create practical challenges for competition 
authorities beyond competition policy orthodoxy. This includes accessing the necessary 
information to effectively review anti-competitive practices. SOEs might have less regard 
for the competition authorities and might even face pressure from their governments not to 
engage with competition authorities, notably where the SOE is embroiled in broader political 
issues. The EU Gazprom case clearly demonstrated how competition investigations can have 
geopolitical elements, given that the Russian state sought to obstruct foreign investigations 
of Russian strategic enterprises and prohibited Gazprom from replying to the information 
requests issued by the European Commission (OECD, 2018). 
DG Competition has tools to address non-compliance, such as imposing fines for 
supplying inaccurate or misleading information. While such tools could be used more 
aggressively, they might not be sufficient. In a case in which a trading partner of the EU 
controls an SOE that does not comply with a Commission investigation, the matter could well 
be elevated beyond competition enforcement. For this reason, close coordination between 
DG Competition and DG Trade in such cases is warranted.
5.1 Sanctions and remedies
The topic of sanctions for anticompetitive practices by SOEs also needs reflection. In particu-
lar, calculating the appropriate level of fines following a violation might be difficult where 
an SOE’s turnover figures are not public, either because of the complex structure of the SOE 
or where access to the necessary information is being obstructed. In addition, the deterrent 
effect of fines might be limited if financial penalties are effectively paid from state coffers (or 
are ultimately passed-on to taxpayers). 
Any company found to have abused their market power must, of course, cease the infring-
ing activity. In order to ensure compliance, transparency requirements could be imposed on 
an infringing SOE active in Europe to ensure future pricing strategies are legal. Classic anti-
trust remedies are devised for traditional market participants but one could envisage broader 
tools in the case of SOEs. The Commission has some flexibility in fashioning acceptable solu-
tions (such as requiring procurement in Europe contracts to take into account any history of 
market abuse or transparency in accounting), as long as these are effective and proportionate 
to ensuring a level playing field. 
11 Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, of 20 March 2001, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001D0354&from=EN.
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5.2 Market guidance
Drawing inspiration from past cases, the Commission could develop a more coherent policy 
on the specific challenges raised by SOEs, as discussed above. The Commission could fulfil its 
policy function by ensuring that European competition rules relating to SOEs are clear and 
well-understood, and by providing clarity to market participants through a range of soft-law 
instruments, including guidelines and guidance papers, informal guidance letters12, annu-
al work plans and commissioned studies, which should show what practices undertakings 
should consider carefully. Issuing guidelines that address SOE market distortions will allow 
the Commission to hone its analytical tools to the specific characteristics of SOEs and provide 
clarity to the market about where its enforcement priorities lie. More coherent action by the 
European Commission relating to SOEs will be important to show that third-country govern-
ment protection of SOEs will not be a shield against competition law enforcement.
6 SOEs and European industrial policy 
Overall, the EU can seek to address the negative effect of SOE activity. Trade policy and trade 
defence actions under World Trade Organisation rules can be used to address the source of 
the problem, but to address the effects of the problem, the Commission might wish to consid-
er competition law remedies if there is evidence of anticompetitive distortion.
The EU competition commissioner has broad discretion to prioritise cases and allocate 
resources, notably to ensure that competition actions are coherent and consistent with the 
EU’s stated policy goals. The 2018 Gazprom case is instructive: the European Commission 
investigated the Russian energy SOE because of concerns that Gazprom imposed, among 
other things, territorial restrictions and excessive pricing on its energy customers. The Euro-
pean Commission extracted commitments from Gazprom ensuring that customers had the 
ability to renegotiate long-term conditions in supply contracts, thereby increasing competi-
tion in the gas market. The Gazprom investigation also took place in the context of Europe’s 
policy imperatives of realising a true internal market for energy, and of ensuring competitive 
energy pricing. 
The European Commission is seeking to adapt to new realities of global competition. It 
is considering means of plugging the enforcement gap relating to the unlevel playing field 
created by protectionist industrial policies of third countries through the activities of their 
SOEs. This is especially important given evidence of under-enforcement by the Commission 
(Schrepel, 2019). The paucity of realistic competition policy proposals to date does not reflect 
the significant role that competition policy can play as part of the range of European tools 
available to ensure a level playing field. The European Commission could exercise its compe-
tition powers more actively wherever the unlevel playing field distorts the internal market. 
Opportunities exist to enhance the Commission’s decision-making, analytical and 
enforcement capabilities. The difficulties of addressing abusive SOE action cannot discourage 
competition authorities from their task of ensuring a level playing field for European markets, 
companies and consumers.
12 The Commission's 'Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters)' is in the Official Journal C 101, 27 April 2004, pp 78-80. 
The notice sets out the conditions under which the Commission may issue informal guidance letters, which would 
be apposite given how particular the SOE issue is.
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